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Comments

From Siri to Sci-Fi: Are Lethal Robots
People Too?
Anna Fosberg*
ABSTRACT
Autonomous weapons systems, colloquially referred to as “killer
robots,” are becoming less of a science fiction fantasy and more of a reality
on the modern battlefield. They operate based on Artificial Intelligence
(AI) which helps them undergo a self-learning thought process, where the
machines learn new tasks based on responses from previous interactions.
As the AI behind these systems becomes more sophisticated, the machines
engage in greater autonomous decision-making.
As they function with increased autonomy, some weapons experts
and governments have suggested extending legal personhood to
autonomous weapons systems because their decision-making resembles
that of human brains. Theoretically, this extension would resemble how
corporations operate as legal persons, even though corporations are a type
of business entity. Although the comparison reveals notable similarities at
the surface, it ultimately fails. Because autonomous systems are weapons,
their use must conform to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. I
would like to thank Vice Admiral (Ret.) James W. Houck for his continued mentorship,
encouragement, and guidance while writing this Comment. I would also like to thank my
outstanding editors, Ani Esenyan, Melissa Blanco, and Erin Clawson Zorn for their careful
editing.
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does not support such an extension of corporate personhood. The doctrine
of IHL has restrictively extended the idea of personhood, and no express
declaration from either the United States Congress or the United Nations
supports a broad expansion.
Furthermore, fundamental principles of corporate law, such as the
piercing the corporate veil doctrine, cannot apply to autonomous weapons
systems. Because weapons systems are machines, they cannot hold
financial assets or deliberately abuse a limited liability shield. Ultimately,
the failed application of this analogy under IHL combined with the
inapplicability of key principles of corporate law indicates that extending
legal personhood to autonomous weapons systems cannot succeed.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Robots and autonomous weapons systems are not legal persons under
the current law.1 Such a distinction is necessary because, although they are
just machines, the computer programming behind autonomous systems2 is
rapidly advancing.3 Artificial intelligence (AI)4 is becoming smarter and
1. See Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 93 (2015).
2. As defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, autonomous weapons systems are
“weapon system[s] that once activated, can selected and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NO. 3000.09, DIRECTIVE:
AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13 (2012) http://bit.ly/2Ne9bg4 [hereinafter DOD
DIRECTIVE 3000.09]. The phrase “autonomous system” and “autonomous weapons
system,” may have slightly different connotations, but this Comment uses both terms
interchangeably to refer to military systems with some degree of automated capacity. See
generally Raja Chatila & Catherine Tessier, A Guide to Lethal Autonomous Weapon
Systems, CNRS NEWS FR. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2QbsSpi.
3. See Janosch Delcker, Europe divided over robot ‘personhood,’ POLITICO (Apr. 11,
2018, 12:45 PM), https://politi.co/2GSxkTH.
4. AI is a sub-field of computer science that examines how machines can imitate
human mental skills, such as pattern recognition, understanding natural language, or
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more autonomous and the technology engages in a thought process that
operates similarly to human consciousness.5 The possibility of recognizing
personhood for AI is relevant in both civil and military contexts; the latter
is the focus of this Comment.6
A notable example of advanced AI in the civilian world is Sophia the
Robot.7 As her name suggests, Sophia is a robot with a realistic human
appearance who can engage in conversations and act upon human traits,
such as compassion.8 In 2017, she was granted full citizenship in Saudi
Arabia.9 Sophia is the first robot to receive legal citizenship status,10 and
in 2018 she received the first-ever robot visa.11 While universal rights of
robots may sound like science fiction, Sophia’s technological
advancement and international recognition offer a glimpse into the future
evolution of AI and legal personhood.12
With respect to the military, autonomous systems are starting to make
lethal decisions, meaning that the machines, not their human operators,
decide when to engage in lethal force.13 For example, Russia is currently
developing a weapon to make “shoot-no-shoot” decisions.14 The U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes autonomous drones.15 And Israel
currently employs a fully autonomous loitering munition,16 the Harop,
which can independently dive-bomb radar signals.17
adaptive learning from experience. Bernard Marr, The Key Definitions of Artificial
Intelligence (AI) That Explain Its Importance, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2018 1:27 AM),
https://bit.ly/2AynpSI; see also infra Section II.A.
5. See Delcker, supra note 3.
6. See infra Section II.B., Part III.
7. See Sophia, HANSON ROBOTICS, https://bit.ly/2EINLmm (last visited Oct. 30,
2018).
8. See id.
9. See Emily Reynolds, The agony of Sophia, the world’s first robot citizen
condemned to a lifeless career in marketing, WIRED (June 1, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RyulIW.
10. See id.
11. Paul Armstrong, AI Humanoid ‘Sophia’ Is Granted First Ever Robot Visa, Speaks
With President, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2018, 10:42 AM), https://bit.ly/2AADM13.
12. Despite her developments, Sophia is not without criticism. See Jaden Urbi, The
complicated truth about Sophia the robot-an almost human robot or a PR stunt, CNBC
(June 5, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://cnb.cx/2kQLzPD. Sophia is criticized because she
appears “hot” or “sexy.” See id. Others question why she was granted citizenship in Saudi
Arabia, which is a nation that still maintains male guardianship over women. See Reynolds,
supra note 9.
13. See Billy Perrigo, A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the
Battlefield, TIME (Apr. 9, 2018, 2:12 PM), https://bit.ly/2C9FHK0.
14. See id.
15. While not all autonomous drones are weaponized, they nevertheless exemplify
how this technology is evolving and has the potential for a military capacity. See id. They
also demonstrate the military’s interest in autonomous technology. Id.
16. A loitering munition is a weapons system that “loiters” above the target and
strikes its target after waiting for it to arrive. Aire Egozi, Loitering Weapon Systems - A
Growing Demand, IHLS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://bit.ly/2PL4UCt.
17. See Perrigo, supra note 13 (recognizing nations that have already deployed AI in
a military capacity); see also infra Section III.B.
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While militarized AI is largely a vision of the future, legal
personhood for robots is a topic of current discussion in the international
community.18 In 2017, the European Parliament suggested that selflearning robots19 should receive electronic personalities,20 which would be
a limited legal status specific to robots.21 However, 156 AI experts,
consisting of computer scientists, law professors, and CEOs,22 responded
with a letter23 arguing against the proposition.24 The experts insisted that
the current civil laws of the European Union are sufficient to manage robot
liability.25 In addition to the ethical implications of elevating robots to a
personhood status, the experts asserted that granting this special legal
status could insulate manufacturers from liability.26 Ultimately, the
European Commission did not implement the European Parliament’s
suggestion of electronic personhood.27 Although the European
Commission did not validate electronic personhood in this instance, the
discussion is not foreclosed. As AI technology continues to evolve, other
governments and legislatures will consider the question as to the
appropriate legal status for this person-like technology.28
With respect to militarized AI, autonomous weapons systems differ
from traditional weapons because these systems act in accordance with
software codes and programming, as opposed to direct human control.29
Thus, anticipating and accounting for the behavior of militarized AI is
difficult.30 The absence of direct human control is prompting governments

18. See Thomas Burri, The EU is right to refuse legal personality for Artificial
Intelligence, EUROACTIV (May 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/2EZE30h; see also infra Section
III.B.
19. Self-learning robots learn new tasks through a trial and error process, which is
similar to how humans learn. See John Straw, Self Learning Robots, DISRUPTIONHUB (June
18, 2015), https://bit.ly/33sxrRa.
20. Electronic personhood and electronic personality both refer to the idea of granting
a legal entity status to robots. See Delcker, supra note 3.
21. This legal status would allow robots to be sued and insured individually and
obtain liability and protections separate from their creators. See id. Robots would not be
full citizens with all rights of people. For example, they would not have the right to marry.
See id.
22. Nathalie Navejan, a French law professor at the Université d’Artois, and Noel
Sharkey, a professor of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield,
were two of the experts who expressed concern that electronic personhood would absolve
manufactures of liability. See id.
23. The letter received the consensus that granting robots electronic personhood
would be irresponsible for ethical and legal reasons. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Delcker, supra note 3.
27. See Burri, supra note 18.
28. See Delcker, supra note 3.
29. See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513,
534 (2015).
30. See id.
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to consider issues of accountability when determining the proper status of
these systems.
The advanced capabilities of autonomous weapons systems have led
experts to question the proper entity status of these systems.31 Similar to
how autonomous weapons systems act without the necessary involvement
of individual people, corporations can act in their own name.32 Therefore,
assigning a legal personhood status to autonomous weapons systems
would seem to mirror the reasoning behind corporate personhood.33
However, the fact that these systems are ultimately just weapons,
combined with the different bodies of law that govern weapons as opposed
to corporations, reasons against expanding corporate personhood to these
systems.34
Part II of this Comment will present an overview of the background
material relevant to the analysis of this Comment.35 Specifically, Part II
will provide a general overview of AI36 and how AI can act with varying
degrees of autonomy;37 the military potential for AI;38 how the corporate
personhood theory has evolved over time into granting a legal entity status
with very high levels of autonomy;39 and the laws of war that govern the
use of autonomous weapons systems.40
Next, Part III will explain how the theories of corporate personhood
do not analogize to autonomous weapons systems when analyzed under
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).41 Part III will then argue that IHL
is the best doctrine under which to analyze the entity status of autonomous
weapons systems and explain how customary international law
distinguishes machines from humans.42 Next, Part III will analyze why the
piercing the corporate veil doctrine does not apply to autonomous
systems.43 Ultimately, Part III will recommend that legal personhood
should not extend to autonomous systems.44 Finally, Part IV will offer
concluding statements on the issues raised by this Comment.45

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Delcker, supra note 3.
See Bayern, supra note 1, at 96.
See id. at 94.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
See infra Part IV.
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BACKGROUND

As AI becomes more autonomous and “human-like,” some experts
have looked to the evolving theories of corporate personhood as a structure
for categorizing autonomous systems.46 Similarly, as corporations have
evolved, the corresponding corporate personhood theories have mirrored
this development to allow a corporation to be viewed as an independent
and distinct entity.47 Unlike corporations, which are legal entities governed
by state law, autonomous systems are weapons systems that are governed
by IHL, which does not support an expansion of legal personhood to nonhuman entities.48
A.

What is AI, and How Does It Work?

AI is a sub-field of computer science that examines how machines
can imitate human mental skills, such as pattern recognition,
understanding natural language, and adaptive learning from experience.49
Broadly, AI is composed of computations that allow machines to
“perceive, reason, and act.”50 Specifically, AI is “[t]he theory and
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally
requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech
recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.”51 AI
distinguishes itself from regular computer programming because the
machines are able to learn and subsequently correct themselves.52 Thus,
AI uses a trial and error “thought process” which mimics the mental
process that the human brain performs when learning a new task.53
In terms of measuring AI development, AI can fall into one of three
categories: narrow;54 strong;55 or superintelligence.56 Narrow AI is
“machine intelligence that equals or exceeds human intelligence for
specific tasks.”57 For example, narrow AI includes algorithms that route
46. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing the application of modern entity law
for autonomous systems).
47. See infra Section II.C.
48. See infra Sections III.A–B.
49. See Marr, supra note 4.
50. STEPHAN DE SPIEGELEIRE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF
DEFENSE: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED FORCE PROVIDERS 27
(2017), http://bit.ly/2CuV1lQ.
51. Marr, supra note 4.
52. See Sarah Dai & Alice Shen, Made in China 2025: China has a competitive AI
game plan but success will need cooperation, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 1, 2018,
11:00 PM), https://bit.ly/2Rj1a9w.
53. See id.
54. See Ray Kurzweil, On My Mind: Long Live AI, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2005),
https://bit.ly/2CNkmHG.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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information used when a person sends an email.58 Strong AI, on the other
hand, is “machine intelligence with the full range of human intelligence.”59
Sophia the Robot, for instance, is likely considered strong AI because she
functions with machine learning akin to human consciousness.60 Finally,
super-intelligent AI is “machine intelligence that exceeds human
intelligence across any task.”61 Even though computers can beat humans
at Jeopardy, and devices such as Siri62 engage in simple conversations, the
general consensus remains that no super-intelligent AI exists, even though
those examples function at a super-intelligent level.63
B.

Autonomous Systems Within the U.S. Military

AI also includes weapons systems that act with varying degrees of
autonomy.64 Autonomy refers to the ability of a machine to perform a task
or function on its own.65 An autonomous weapons system is “any system
that is capable of targeting and initiating the use of potentially lethal force
without direct human supervision . . . in lethal decision-making.”66 Some
systems operate completely independently, whereas others require human
involvement to help the machine make decisions.67
Several definitions exist regarding what constitutes autonomy in the
weapons context.68 For example, the DoD defines an autonomous weapon
as a system that “once active, can select and engage targets without further
intervention by a human operator.”69 Semi-autonomous weapons, on the
other hand, are weapons systems that are only aimed to engage individual
and specific targets that are pre-selected by a human operator.70

58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See Reynolds, supra note 9.
61. DE SPIEGELEIRE ET AL., supra note 50, at 30. A superintelligent system would be
able to conduct decision-making that goes beyond our current cognitive abilities. See Luke
Dormehl, A beginner’s guide to A.I. superintelligence and ‘the singularity, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Oct. 4, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2wxekVH.
62. Siri is an “intelligent assistant” on iPhones that utilizes machine learning to
respond to voice commands from the user. Siri, APPLE, https://apple.co/32lDaqY (last
visited Feb. 9, 2020).
63. See Artificial Superintelligence (ASI), TECHOPEDIA, https://bit.ly/2EPf9B5 (last
visited Feb. 9, 2020).
64. See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE
OF WAR 27 (1st ed. 2018).
65. See id.
66. Peter Asaro, On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights,
automation, and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
687, 690 (2012).
67. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 30.
68. See Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapon
Systems, MIL. REV., May–June 2017, at 72, 77.
69. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 2, at 13.
70. See id.
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The level of a machine’s autonomy depends on the degree to which
it performs tasks independently and with less direction from human
operators.71 The DoD unmanned system roadmaps72 classify autonomy
along a spectrum,73 which separates into three primary categories.74
The first category focuses on the task the machine is performing.75
Generally, the machine will perform some tasks autonomously while
humans remain in control of others.76 For example, U.S. fighter aircraft
have been modified with an automatic ground collision avoidance system
(Auto-GCAS).77 If the pilot is about to crash, Auto-GCAS will take control
of the aircraft and pull it up away from the ground before it crashes.78
Hence, the machine makes the decision about pulling away from the
ground and deciding the best manner to avoid a crash.79
A machine should not be referred to as autonomous without reference
to the exact task that becomes automated.80 For example, cars are driven
by humans but operate with autonomous functions, such as automatic
braking, automatic seat belt retractions, and automatic airbags.81 These
autonomous functions assist the driver, but the car is not a fully
autonomous machine because the car remains under direct human
control.82 A car, therefore, operates similarly to the Auto-GCAS system
because a human remains in control of the operations except for select
safety functions.
The second category along the autonomy spectrum focuses on the
relationship between the human and the machine when the machine
performs a task.83 This category further divides into two types of
operations. The first is “semiautonomous operations,” in which the human
is “in” the loop.84 The second is “supervised autonomous operations,” in
which the human sits “on” the loop.85 The term “loop” refers to the military
71. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 28.
72. The DoD Unmanned Systems Roadmaps discuss the development of autonomous
systems. See GCN Staff, DOD’s roadmap to integrated unmanned systems, GCN (Sept.
14, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UFUP9h. They discuss how the technology can be integrated into
the current operations of the DoD. See id; see also DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 2,
at 1.
73. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 27.
74. See id. at 28.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. (noting that this system has already saved at least one aircraft in combat,
rescuing a U.S. F-16 in Syria).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 28.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 29.
85. See id.
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OODA loop,86 which stands for “observe, orient, decide, and act.”87 This
loop guides the AI’s rational thinking towards responding to a stimulus in
chaotic or confusing situations.88
A semiautonomous system can sense the environment and
recommend how to proceed, yet the machine cannot perform the task until
it receives a human command.89 Hence, the human is “in” the loop because
he remains involved in how the machine senses, decides, and then acts.90
A supervised autonomous system can sense, decide, and act on its
own, but a human user retains control over the machine’s behavior,
allowing the person to potentially intervene and change the machine’s
behavior.91 For example, humans stay “on” the loop in combat operations
to protect communication links of cyber operations.92 The human
involvement ensures that the technology is not compromised by an adverse
armed party.93 The machine does not make its own determinations.94
Hence, the human primarily serves as a check on the machine’s decisionmaking.95 For example, the human supervisor decides to land an aircraft
or decides to order mechanical parts.96 Thus, the human user working with
a supervised autonomous system is “on” the loop.97
For example, the Phalanx Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) is an
independent and self-contained unit with an automated fire-control
system.98 Thus, a CIWS can automatically search for, detect, track,
engage, and confirm targets using its computer-controlled radar system.99
The CIWS requires human supervision and only attacks specific targets,
such as missiles or boats, that the human operators identify.100
The third category refers to the sophistication of the machine’s
decision-making process when performing a task.101 Fully autonomous

86. See id.
87. See OODA LOOP: What You Can Learn from Fighter Pilots About Making Fast
and Accurate Decisions, FARNAM STREET BLOG, https://bit.ly/2CaM3c3 (last visited Oct.
27, 2018).
88. See id.
89. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29.
90. See id.
91. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29.
92. See David Vergun, Supervised autonomy the goal in Army aviation, says major
general, ARMY.MIL (Sept. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BD2j4M.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29.
98. See Charlie Dunlap, Jr., Autonomous weapons and the law: the Yale and
Brookings discussions, LAWFIRE BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2AsLpGs.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 30.
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systems sense, decide, and act without human intervention.102 The human
is entirely “out” of the loop.103 The machine is acting on its own, as would
a regular solider. Before deploying a fully autonomous weapon, however,
a fully autonomous machine must “learn” to act consistently within the
laws of war.104 Assuming that the autonomous system operates lawfully,
AI experts and military personnel suggest that autonomous systems have
great military potential because of a machine’s ability to act more precisely
than humans.105 Machines do not experience fatigue and emotions that can
impair judgment, and consequently diminish the quality of a task.106
Beginning in 2005, the DoD began publishing a series of roadmaps
for future unmanned system investment.107 These roadmaps discussed
sensors, communications, power, weapons, propulsion, and other
technologies.108 The DoD roadmaps have the long-term goal of achieving
complete autonomy for these weapons systems.109 The 2011 roadmap
outlines four stages of autonomy: (1) human-operated; (2) human
delegate; (3) human supervised; and (4) fully autonomous.110 Investment
in unmanned systems is expanding,111 per the goals of the DoD, with the
eventual goal of fully integrating unmanned systems into combat
operations over the next 25 years.112 Advanced autonomous systems
would have the ability to analyze and adapt to the environment, and they
would interact with other autonomous systems.113
As AI advances, autonomy is a key objective as it reduces the human
workload required for military operations.114 A lighter human workload
will lead to greater military efficiencies,115 such as manpower

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Dunlap, supra note 98; see also infra Section II.D.
105. See Dunlap, supra note 98.
106. See id.
107. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 27.
108. See id., at 15.
109. See id.
110. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP: FY20112036 46 (2011) [hereinafter UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP].
111. See Michael C. Horowitz, The Algorithms of August, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12,
2018, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2x6tNxD (commenting that the private sector invested
between 15 and 23 billion dollars in AI in 2016).
112. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 46
(commenting that the full potential of unmanned systems will occur when they have highly
autonomous capabilities and can interact with their surroundings).
113. See id.
114. See id. at 20. In January 2017, the DoD produced an autonomous drone swarm
of 103 robots flying over California whose flight path was determined in real-time by an
algorithm. See Perrigo, supra note 13. Even though this is not a weaponized example, it
demonstrates the rapidly evolving trend of this technology and hints at its military
application. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20.
115. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20.
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productivities, cost savings,116 and quicker human decision-making.117
Autonomous systems produce greater military advantages like increasing
the efficacy of each combatant, expanding the battlefield to previously
inaccessible areas and reducing causalities by removing human
combatants from dangerous missions.118
C.

Overview of the Development of Corporate Personhood

As AI becomes more advanced, experts and governments have
considered granting the technology a special legal status similar to that of
a corporation.119 A corporation is an artificial entity that exists through
recognition of the law and can act only through its agents.120 A corporation
is also a legal entity with an identity, or personality, that is completely
separate from that of its owners.121 To gain this separate identity, a
corporation must incorporate122 by filing the articles of incorporation with
a state’s Secretary of State.123
Corporations have standing to enter into contracts, hold property, sue
and be sued, and conduct business in the corporate name.124 Unless its
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation generally
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary to fully
116. In a 2013 article in The Fiscal Times, DoD figures estimated that “each soldier
in Afghanistan costs the Pentagon roughly $850,000 per year,” whereas “the TALON
robot, a small rover outfitted with weapons, costs $230,000.” Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note
68, at 72.
117. UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 45–48; see also
Mark M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L.
617, 625 (2014) (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
No. 106-398, § 220(a), 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A to 38 (2000)) (mandating that one-third of
designated U.S. military aircraft and ground combat vehicles be unmanned by 2010 and
2015).
118. See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 72.
119. See Bayern, supra note 1, at 97; see also Delcker, supra note 3.
120. See Premium Prod., Inc. v. Pro Performance Sports, LLC, 997 F. Supp. 2d 433,
437 (E.D. Va. 2014).
121. See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d
1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973).
122. To incorporate, a person from the company engages in the process of filing the
necessary documents with the Secretary of State to form a legal corporation. See
Incorporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
123. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES,
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 191 (3d ed. 2016). The articles of incorporation refer to the
original articles of incorporations, all amendments, and any other documents permitted or
required to be filed with the Secretary of State. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016). At a minimum, the articles of incorporation must include (1) a corporate
name for the corporation; (2) the number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue;
(3) the street address of the corporation’s registered office and the name of its registered
agent at that office; and (4) the name and address of each incorporator. See id.
124. See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 106
(2009).
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conduct its business and affairs,125 such as signing contracts or accruing
business debts.126 Because a corporation is an artificial concept, and not a
natural human, these actions are conducted by the directors or officers of
the corporation.127
Shareholders in a corporation are not personally liable for the debts
and obligations of the corporation.128 This limited liability of shareholders
allows for greater business growth, increased access to monetary
resources, and reduced risk to shareholders wanting to invest in a business
without becoming personally liable to the company’s creditors.129
Despite the general guarantees of limiting personal liability after
incorporating, this advantage is not absolute.130 The doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil131 allows courts to impose personal liability on
shareholders for the debts or liabilities of the corporation when the
corporation engages in some form of misconduct.132 Hence, incorporating
does not create a complete barrier from liability.133 The rationale for
piercing the corporate veil is that if the beneficial “veil” of limited liability
is abused then liability for wrongdoing should fall on the blameworthy
actor, which could be an individual within the company.134
Two general factors exist in piercing the corporate veil cases: (1)
domination or control by a shareholder, whether an individual or another
corporate entity, over the subject corporation; and (2) a fraud, wrong, or
injustice.135 Within these general factors, smaller considerations often
influence courts to find personal liability: (1) lack of corporate formalities;
(2) commingling of corporate assets; (3) undercapitalization;136 (4)
125. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
126. See id. § 6.22 (stating that a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable
for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by
reason of his own acts or conduct).
127. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 368.
128. See id. at 297.
129. See id. But cf. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481, 493 (1909) (recognizing corporate criminal liability).
130. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297; see also infra Section III.C.
131. See infra Section III.C.
132. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297-99. But see Krivo Indus. Supply Co.
v. Nat’l Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the
corporate form should not be taken lightly given that it is one the principle benefits behind
the purpose of incorporation).
133. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 299.
134. See id. at 298; see also United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142
F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (“[W]hen the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons.”).
135. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 299.
136. Undercapitalization refers to a company that does not have enough capital to
conduct its business. See Capitalization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Thus,
when a company lacks sufficient capital, it is undercapitalized. Id. The theory behind
undercapitalization is that if owners chose to run a business with insufficient capital to
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allegation of a tort; and (5) misrepresentation or fraud.137 The corporate
veil is pierced based on an individualized fact-based analysis, as opposed
to a process codified by state statute.138 The factual context is extremely
important in weighing the relevant factors in deciding whether to pierce
the corporate veil.139
Years of U.S. jurisprudence have allowed the term “person” to
include both natural persons and artificial entities, such as corporations.140
Thus, legal personhood for corporations has developed through various
theories over time.141 Corporations have been thought of as (1) an artificial
and dependent person, (2) an aggregate person, and, most recently, (3) a
real and independent person.142
Under the first theory, which arose during the first half of the
Nineteenth Century,143 a corporation was viewed as an artificial and
dependent person that is solely a legal construct created to facilitate
commerce.144 If a corporation only receives legal recognition through state
approval, the corporation depends on the law to recognize its legal
personhood,145 and it possesses only the abilities that the state chose to
grant.146 Under this theory, legal personality was primarily granted when
a corporation could offer society a specific benefit that required this
separate legal status.147
The second theory of corporate personhood, which arose during the
last half of the Nineteenth Century,148 views the corporation as an
aggregate person because a corporation could not be formed without the
cover expenses, then they should accrue personal liability. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note
123, at 302. Although deciding to pierce the corporate veil is done on a case-by-case basis,
when combined with other factors, undercapitalization is a significant factor for
consideration. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 302.
137. BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 300–04.
138. See id. at 298 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005)).
139. See id. at 305.
140. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 65 (2018). But see People ex rel. Nonhuman
Rights Project, Inc. v. Larvey, 124 A.D.3d 148, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding that a
chimpanzee was not a person entitled to rights afforded by a writ of habeas corpus).
141. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 106.
142. See id. (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005)).
143. See id. at 107.
144. See id. at 106.
145. See id. at 107.
146. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
147. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E. Holding Corp., 132 A.3d 35, 59
(Del. Ch. 2015) (first citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 636 (“[a] corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law, and being
a purely metaphysical creature . . . because it lacks a body and mind, a corporation only
can act through human agents.”); then citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135
(2014) (recognizing that a corporation is a distinct legal entity that can act only through its
agents); and then citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (holding that
artificially entities such as corporations may act only through their agents)).
148. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 109.
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action and agreement of human beings.149 Human involvement is critical,
as the corporation can only act through the people who manage it.150 The
aggregate theory holds that “the corporate person has no existence or
identity that is separate . . . from the natural persons in the corporation.”151
The entity is entirely owned and managed by people, and the corporation’s
actions are actually conducted by its employees, as opposed to the
corporation itself.152
The aggregate person theory became less prominent during the early
Twentieth Century, as corporations grew increasingly large in size.153 As
the role of shareholders became more tangential to the corporation’s
management, the identity of large corporations became separate from their
shareholders.154 The corporation no longer resembled the aggregate
consciousness of its shareholders, because it evolved into its own entity.155
Additionally, as an artificial entity, the corporation could potentially exist
indefinitely, whereas individual shareholders cannot.156 These new
considerations about the increased sized and perpetual duration of
corporations prompted a new theory to explain corporate personhood.157
The third theory, the real entity theory, views the corporation as “an
undeniably real and non-imaginary person.”158 The corporation has its own
consciousness and its actions are considered qualitatively different from
those of its members.159 Under this theory, a corporation can act by its own
volition.160 Hence, the corporation becomes responsible for its own
actions161 and would assume its own (criminal) liability distinct from any
potential liability of its members.162 By viewing the corporation as a
separate entity, the law treats the corporation like an autonomous
individual.163 The precedent of corporate personhood is the foundation for
exploring the possibility of expanding legal personhood to other nonhuman entities, such as highly advanced autonomous systems.164

149. See id.
150. See In re Bean, 278 B.R. 567, 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).
151. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110.
152. See In re Bean, 278 B.R. at 568.
153. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 111.
154. See id.
155. See id..
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 112 (citing W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of
the Corporation and the State, 21 L. Q. REV. 365, 370 (1905)).
159. See id. at 114.
160. See id.
161. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495
(1909) (recognizing corporate criminal liability).
162. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 115.
163. See id.; see also Bayern, supra note 1, at 95.
164. See Delcker, supra note 3.
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The Laws of War

As autonomous weapons systems expand, their use must conform to
the four main principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and
IHL.165 Unlike corporations, which are governed by state law, IHL applies
internationally and provides a set of rules that aim to limit the suffering of
combatants and non-combatants during a conflict.166 IHL protects those
who are not participating in the conflict and restricts the “means and
weapons of warfare.”167 As noted in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention,168 IHL applies only during an armed conflict,169 it does not
apply during peacetime.170
IHL consists of four main principles: (1) humanity; (2) necessity; (3)
proportionality; and (4) distinction.171 Humanity prohibits the “infliction
of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate
military purpose.”172 Military necessity justifies certain actions as
necessary to defeat the enemy as efficiently as possible.173 Proportionality
requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, the
actions should not be unreasonable or excessive.174 Finally, distinction
refers to the obligation to distinguish between civilians and armed
forces.175

165. See Dunlap, supra note 98. The terms “Laws of Armed Conflict” and
“International Humanitarian Law” are very similar and are often used interchangeably. See
id. This Comment will refer to “International Humanitarian Law” because of its uniform
recognition in international law and academic discussions. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL.,
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 277 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016).
166. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278.
167. War & Law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://bit.ly/2rcQh0F (last visited
Oct. 21, 2018).
168. The Additional Protocols supplement the Geneva Conventions to account for the
changes in war, from conflicts fought by large State armies into conflicts of States fighting
smaller non-State actors. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 286.
169. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. An armed conflict exists when two
states are engaged in armed violence. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I,
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at
279.
170. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278. Peacetime refers to “a time when a
nation is not at war.” Peacetime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2Mkjs9x (last visited
Jan. 19, 2019).
171. “Parties shall distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and shall direct military operations only against military
objectives.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 169, at art. 48.
172. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 50–59 (2015),
https://bit.ly/2WRuUhj [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
173. See id. at 51.
174. Id.
175. See id.
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These principles aim to limit the suffering of non-combatants during
military attacks.176 Generally, an attack refers to “acts of violence against
the adversary, whether in offense or in defense.”177 Indiscriminate attacks
are prohibited.178 Indiscriminate attacks are attacks that are not directed at
a specific military object, employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or use a method or
means of combat with effects that cannot be limited as required by the
Additional Protocol.179
Autonomous systems differ from traditional weapons, like bullets,
because these systems employ programming.180 Given that autonomous
systems operate through software codes, anticipating and accounting for
their behavior is difficult.181 The uncertainty in predicting the behavior of
autonomous weapons systems presents challenges because the weapon’s
operator cannot know whether using the weapon will comply with IHL.
Moreover, as the weapons advance, their increased independence and
autonomous functions further obfuscate the proper characterization or
entity status.182
IHL heavily relies on the concept of custom.183 Although no
definition of customary law is universally accepted,184 the international
community generally accepts international norms that emerge from
consistent State practice or behavior that, over time, becomes accepted as
a legal obligation.185 Commenting on the consistency of State practice, the

176. See id. at 15.
177. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 169.
178. See id.
179. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 286. Additional Protocol I governs
international armed conflicts and essentially codifies the laws of war. See DYCUS ET AL.,
supra note 165, at 286. Additional Protocol II allows for greater protection of individuals
in non-international conflicts. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 287. However, the
United States has not ratified either Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. See
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 287.
180. See Calo, supra note 29, at 534.
181. See id.
182. See Perrigo, supra note 13.
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987). Evidence
of custom includes treaties, decisions of national courts and international tribunals, national
legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal advisors, and the practice
of international organizations. See Customary International Law: Research Guides &
Background Information, DUKE L., https://bit.ly/2qlkSsm (last visited Dec. 23, 2019)
(citing Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly (Part II):
Ways and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily
Available, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 367, ILC Doc. A/1316).
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST.
1987).
185. See id.
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International Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf186 noted that
State practice should be “extensive and virtually uniform.”187
Regardless of the persuasive nature of international legal obligations,
custom is not equivalent to U.S. law on U.S. soil.188 IHL, however, is still
relevant to U.S. law.189 In Hamdan v. United States,190 for example, the
D.C. Circuit noted that Congress essentially incorporates the international
laws of war into domestic law, rather than creating a U.S. common law of
war.191 In Hamdan, the court reasoned that the lack of clear consensus
within customary international law should not create a bright-line rule that
requires civil or criminal liability within the U.S.192
Despite the ambiguities of customary international law, the United
Nations (U.N.) Charter, the foundational treaty of the U.N.,193 has been
adhered to by almost all States.194 And even the non-member States have
acquiesced in its principles,195 which reflects the highly persuasive nature
of international custom.
Customary international law is relevant when evaluating corporate
liability in an international context. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,196 the Second Circuit held that “corporate liability is not a discernable
norm of customary international law.”197 The court noted that no
corporation has ever been subject to any form of liability under customary
IHL.198 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority,199
then extended the Kiobel decision in holding that only a natural person is
an individual who can be held liable under the Torture Victim Protection
186. See N. Sea Cont’l Shelf (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den., Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, 43 (Feb. 20 1969).
187. Id.
188. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278.
189. See id.
190. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
191. See id. at n.10; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)
(ruling that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations [must] rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world”).
192. See Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1250.
193. See Charter of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, https://bit.ly/34tqQWY
(last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
194. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278.
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS Law § 102 cmt. h (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
196. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
197. Id. at 131; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018) (holding
that absent further action from Congress, it was inappropriate for courts to extend ATS
liability to foreign corporations).
198. The court considered whether Nigerian residents under a class action lawsuit
could sue under the ATS claiming that Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations
committed human rights abuses and oil exploitation. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123; see also
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1948) (“The [United States] district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a [United States] treaty . . . .”).
199. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1703 (2012).
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Act.200 This ruling maintains the distinction between a natural person and
other entities.201
However, some contrary precedent suggests that non-human entities
can violate, and become liable under, international customary law.202 For
example, the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co.203
held that corporate liability was possible under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).204 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the decision in Kiobel and
reasoned that even if no corporation had ever been punished for violating
customary international law, litigation can be used to enforce an
international norm.205 The court noted that tort liability is a globally
common consideration when deciding in favor of corporate liability.206
Within the military, the development of weapon systems with greater
degrees of autonomy is growing.207 Although these machines may make
decisions like a human mind or a corporate body, this similarity is not
enough to merit an independent entity status.
III. ANALYSIS
Legal personhood status should not extend to autonomous weapons
systems. The discussion of legal personhood for military robots has
received less prominence than that for civil robots, as noted by the
European Parliament’s recent discussion.208 Even so, analyzing militarized
autonomous systems will likely follow the recent discussion of whether to
grant a special type of electronic personhood for autonomous weapons
systems.209
Three reasons support the determination that autonomous weapons
systems do not merit legal personhood based on the corporate personhood
analogy. First, the doctrines of law that govern corporations and war are
fundamentally different. Therefore, the extension of personhood to
autonomous weapons systems based on surface similarities is illogical.210
Second, international custom does not support equating machines to

200. Id. at 1703. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action
against an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2018).
201. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703.
202. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).
203. See id. at 1024
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1017.
206. See id. at 1019.
207. See supra Section II.B.
208. See supra Part I.
209. See supra Part I.
210. See Burri, supra note 18; see also infra Section III.A.
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people.211 Third, inanimate objects cannot be deliberately undercapitalized
in an attempt to escape liability.212
A.

Legal Personhood Under IHL

The legal personhood theory can only apply to persons, not
autonomous weapons systems. Corporations are governed by state and
federal statutes213 (which do recognize legal personhood beyond
humans)214 whereas autonomous weapons systems are governed by IHL
(which has no established precedent recognizing personhood beyond
literal humans).215 Corporate law and IHL support different entities,
systems, and purposes.216 Even though facially the analogy of extending
personhood from one non-human entity to another appears logical, this
comparison will not pass muster when applied to an international doctrine
based on custom, as opposed to a constitution. State constitutions
expressly grant corporations recognition, whereas international custom
(which is not binding law) focuses on governing the behavior of
persons.217
Even though the corporate personhood analogy ultimately fails under
IHL, the surface-level similarities of autonomous systems and
corporations warrant a discussion about the appropriate entity status for
autonomous weapons systems. The real entity theory, which views the
corporation as an independent entity, does not apply to the current
technology given that the extent of human involvement prevents the
machines from operating completely independently.218 The two factors of
longevity and size that prompted theorists to view corporations as real
entities,219 rather than aggregate bodies, do not apply to robots. First,
corporations can exist indefinitely,220 whereas technological innovations
cannot.221 Robots have a lifecycle.222 While this may depend on each
individual system, the lifecycle may typically last between eight and ten

211. See infra Section III.B.
212. See infra Section III.C.
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
214. See supra Section II.C.
215. See Dunlap, supra note 98; see also Section II.D.
216. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. X with U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
217. See Dunlap, supra note 98.
218. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50. Even
though Russia is developing a weapon to make lethal decisions, and Israel has a fully
autonomous loitering munition, these developments are advanced outliers and not common
weapons on the battlefield. See Perrigo, supra note 13.
219. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 111–12; see also supra Section II.C.
220. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 114.
221. Robot Life Cycle-FAQs, MOTION CONTROLS ROBOTICS, https://bit.ly/33ku6Uo
(last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
222. See id.
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years,223 which is shorter than the potentially perpetual duration of a
corporation.
Second, an individual autonomous system is smaller than a large
corporation. Some of the largest corporations on the Fortune 500 list have
millions of employees and millions of dollars in revenue.224 In contrast,
autonomous systems are individual pieces of machinery that do not have
independent assets or revenue values.225 Ultimately, the distinguishing
factors of the real entity theory do not pertain to autonomous systems.226
Therefore, despite the apparent independent decision-making of superintelligent robots, these systems are not structurally similar enough to
corporations to be analyzed under the real entity theory.
On the other hand, the aggregate theory bears more resemblance to
the current setup of autonomous weapons systems. Under the aggregate
theory, the corporation’s identity is inseparable from the humans who
support it.227 Just as corporations make decisions that are administered by
human actions (such as directors approving business decisions)
autonomous systems also rely on humans to make decisions (such as
creating particular programming to distinguish between military and
civilian targets when making lethal decisions).228 Under DoD policy,229
shoot-no-shoot decisions are, ultimately, a human-made decision.230 The
lethal decision is inseparably connected to the human operator.231
Therefore, the inherent interconnection between the operator and the
weapon best resembles the aggregate person theory.232
Given that autonomous systems operate on the battlefield, not in the
boardroom, IHL should guide the appropriate entity status for these
systems because of their specific use in warfare. Instead of assigning
autonomous systems legal personhood based on the U.S. Constitution and
drawing from corporate law, weapons experts and governments should
look to IHL for guidance.233 While IHL does not explicitly address
223. Id.
224. Wal-Mart is number one on the Fortune 500 list, and reported having 2,300,000
employees and $500,343,000 in revenue in 2018. Walmart, FORTUNE GLOBAL 500,
https://bit.ly/2NgAlmt (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
225. See supra Section II.A.
226. See supra Section II.C.
227. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110.
228. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 29; UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP,
supra note 110, at 50; Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 77. See also Bayern, supra note
1, at 93.
229. The current DoD policy requires lethal autonomous systems to remain under
human control. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50.
230. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50.
231. See id.
232. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110; see also supra Section II.C.
233. In particular, the European government has seriously considered this issue;
although, the European Commission did not recognize electronic personhood. See Burri,
supra note 18.
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autonomous systems, it should be central in evaluating their proper entity
status because IHL is the relevant law when determining the legality of
weapons used in conflict.234
The basic purposes of corporations and autonomous systems are
dissimilar.235 Autonomous weapons systems increase military efficiencies
and minimize risk.236 Corporations primarily exist to shield the directors
from personal liability related to poor business decisions.237 Autonomous
systems and corporations exist for separate reasons and strive towards
completely different objectives.238
An autonomous machine is not the functional equivalent of an
independent human person, unlike a corporation that can legally functional
akin to a human person.239 An autonomous weapons system is a weapon.
Unlike an aggregate corporate body where decisions are made based on
collective consciousness,240 the machine does not contribute to the
decision-making process; it responds based on preprogrammed algorithms
that are physically executed by an operator.241 Although machines operate
based on codes created by humans, this coordination is less intensive than
the process directors must undergo when making business decisions
within an aggregate corporate body.242 Autonomous systems do not
contribute input regarding their operations.243 Their actions are
preprogrammed.244 Therefore, autonomous systems operate as inanimate
objects that are extensions of human decision-making, not as independent
individuals on the battlefield or as members of the board of directors.
The laws of war focus on the obligations of the persons engaged in
war,245 not the conduct of robots.246 IHL regulates and prohibits the use of
weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or contribute to indiscriminate
attacks.247 IHL imposes rules on when and how an attack should be
234. See Dunlap, supra note 98.
235. Compare supra Section II.A. with supra Section II.C.
236. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20.
237. See Nikki Nelson, The Benefits of Business Incorporation, WOLTERS KLUWER,
https://bit.ly/2EWfSRT (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
238. Compare supra Section II.A with supra Section II.C.
239. See Kennison v. Daire, (1986) 160 CLR 129, 130 (Austl.) (reasoning that an
ATM could not give the bank’s consent and no principle of law exists that requires it to be
treated as though it were a human person).
240. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 110.
241. See supra Section II.A.
242. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 46; see also
supra Section II.C.
243. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 50.
244. See supra Section II.B.
245. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 177, at 330.
246. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 269 (noting that “people fight wars, not robots”).
247. See id. at 251–52. Over time, several international treaties came into effect to
limit unnecessary suffering. Weapons, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Nov. 30, 2011),
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/weapons. The Geneva Protocol, which has been
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conducted, with a focus on guiding the human behavior involved in
conducting an attack.248
Although weapons used in warfare must conform to IHL principles,
the standard of adhering to these principles does not require autonomous
systems to make legal determinations.249 IHL does not focus on the process
of how a decision is made; under this doctrine of law, the laws focus on
the results of the action, namely whether an indiscriminate attack has
occurred.250 In contrast, directors’ obligations under corporate law are
reviewed based on the process of making business decisions.251 IHL’s
focus on the results of the process rather than the process itself
demonstrates that different standards are emphasized when determining
conformity with the law under corporate law and IHL.252 The different
standards between these bodies of law reflect that U.S. domestic law and
international law support different purposes and structures.
IHL and U.S. law are different legal doctrines that support different
purposes and afford different legal protections.253 Unlike corporations,
which have been granted legal personhood based on their roles in a U.S.
domestic context, autonomous weapons systems operate under IHL, which
is strongly based on international custom.254 By applying the corporate
personhood analogy under IHL, the concept of corporate liability would
have to exist as a recognized principle of international law.255
B.

International Custom: Machines Are Not Humans

International custom does not support equating machines to people,
and it remains divided regarding corporate liability, as discussed below.256

supplemented by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 and the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 1993, prohibits the develop, production, acquisition, use of biological and
chemical weapons. Id. Additionally, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons limits the use of incendiary weapons. See id.
248. See SCHARRE, supra note 64, at 269.
249. See supra Section II.D.
250. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 169, at art. 48.
251. Directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, which require
the directors to act in the best interest of the corporation and maintain an informed process
when making business decisions. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) (noting that a director’s duty to make an informed business decision falls under the
duty of care and that the directors engaged in a poor process when approving the merger);
see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 57 (Del. 2006)
(determining that the compensation committee members were informed when approving
an expensive severance package, and thus, did not breach their duty of care).
252. Compare supra Section II.C. with supra Section II.D.
253. Compare supra Section II.C. with supra Section II.D.
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (AM. LAW INST.
1987); see also supra Section II.D.
255. See supra Section II.D.
256. See infra Section III.B.
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In fact, the existing case law reveals a restrictive view of personhood and
a limitation on corporate liability as a recognized custom.257
For example, in Kiobel258 the Second Circuit held that “corporate
liability is not a discernable norm of customary international law.”259 The
U.S. Supreme Court then extended the Kiobel decision in Mohamad,260
holding that only a natural person is an individual who can be held liable
under the Torture Victim Protection Act.261 These rulings maintain the
distinction between a natural person and other non-human entities.262
Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Flomo, extending
corporate liability under the ATS, the Supreme Court’s holding in
Mohamad263 should govern the entity status of autonomous systems
because of its restrictive view of personhood.264 First, the Court in
Mohamad focused on the concept of natural personhood, whereas the
courts in Flomo and Kiobel focused on the concept of corporate liability.265
Determining the scope of liability is a separate issue from discussing the
proper entity status for autonomous systems. Given that the analysis in
Mohamad more closely aligns with the focus of determining personhood,
Mohamad’s ruling should control.266
Mohamad cautions against extending legal personhood to anything
other than a human individual.267 The common meaning of an individual
refers only to a human being, not an organization, or an entity, or even an
association.268 Even though the Dictionary Act allows the term “person”
to include artificial entities,269 a statute should only extend personhood to
artificial entities if congressional intent clearly warrants such expansion.270
Absent clear statutory or congressional expression, the U.S. Congress
likely intends the term personhood to only pertain to human beings.271 The

257. See infra Section III.B.
258. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
259. Id. at 131; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (2018) (holding
that absent further action from Congress, it was inappropriate for courts to extend ATS
liability to foreign corporations).
260. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1703 (2012).
261. See id. at 1703. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action
against an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2018).
262. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703.
263. See id. The Torture Victim Protection Act authorizes a cause of action against
an individual for acts of torture and extrajudicial killings. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
264. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703.
265. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th Cir. 2011);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cir. 2010).
266. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
270. See Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1703.
271. See id.
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U.S. Congress has not expressed a desire to equate machines to people.272
Thus, the lack of congressional intent further supports the contention that
international customary law restrictively views legal personhood as solely
pertaining to human beings.
Second, even though the court in Flomo held in favor of extending
liability for non-human entities, Flomo only dealt with the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS.273 Flomo may control in specific
situations where an alien autonomous system violates a statute. Because
the narrow application of Flomo goes beyond this analysis, the premise of
Kiobel (that corporate liability is not a norm of customary international
law)274 should be used to determine the entity status of autonomous
systems.
An express, written declaration from the U.N. expanding the term
“person” to include artificial entities would be the strongest indication of
support for electronic personhood under IHL, given that IHL follows the
customary practices of the international community.275 However, the
international community lacks consensus as to the regulation of these
systems and their legal status.276 Specifically, even though the European
Parliament suggested that self-learning robots277 merit electronic
personalities,278 the European Commission ultimately rejected this
contention after opposition from experts,279 and the arguments for and
against an electronic personality remain up for debate.280 The international
myriad of views falls very short of clear statutory intent to recognize
272. Unlike the U.S. Government, the E.U. has considered recognizing an entity
status for robots. See Delcker, supra note 3. This legal status would allow robots to be sued
and insured individually, and obtain liability and protections separate from their creators.
See id.
273. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011).
Additionally, corporate liability is not a set norm of international law. See also Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2nd Cir. 2010).
274. See Kiobel, F.3d at 131.
275. See U.N. Charter art. 43, ¶ 1; see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 383.
276. In addition to considering the appropriate legal status, international groups have
considered banning autonomous systems altogether. See Sono Motoyama, Inside the
United Nations’ Effort to Regulate Autonomous Killer Robots, VERGE (Aug. 27, 2018,
11:11 AM), https://bit.ly/2oelmMH. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which is backed
by Elon Musk, Tesla’s co-founder and CEO, is a non-governmental organization that aims
to ban “killer robots” that could engage targets independently. See id. However, weapons
expert and former disarmament ambassador for India, Amandeep Gill, argues against
Musk’s concerns and emphasizes that humans are still in charge. See id.
277. Self-learning robots learn new tasks through a trial and error process, which is
similar to how humans learn. See John Straw, Self-Learning Robots, DISRUPTION (June 18,
2015), https://bit.ly/2NgZY6K.
278. See Delcker, supra note 3. This legal status would allow robots to be sued and
insured individually, and obtain liability and protections separate from their creators. See
id. Robots would not be full citizens with all rights of people. See id. For example, they
would not have the right to marry. See id.; see also supra Part I.
279. See Burri, supra note 18; see also supra Part I.
280. See Delcker, supra note 3; see also supra Part I.
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electronic personhood.281 Therefore, no express intent, or even a
consensus, exists to support extending legal personhood beyond a person.
C.

Inanimate Objects Cannot be Undercapitalized

Autonomous decisions can increase military efficiency, yet they also
yield questions of accountability.282 In corporate law, when members of
the board of directors of the corporation (rather than the corporation itself)
become personally liable, the liability ensues under the piercing the
corporate veil doctrine.283 Undercapitalization, an important factor when
deciding to pierce the corporate veil, refers to the deliberate choice to
establish a shell corporation, without any viable assets, for the sole purpose
of escaping personal liability.284 However, autonomous systems cannot be
pierced because, unlike corporations, autonomous systems are not
financial liability shields. Autonomous systems are just extremely
advanced pieces of technology; they do not hold financial assets.
Inanimate objects cannot act to commit fraud, unlike corporations that
conduct business in their own name.285
Piercing the corporate veil is appropriate when the totality of the
circumstances indicates that the corporate form is being used to commit
fraud or serve an injustice against the corporate form.286 For example, in
OTR Associates v. IBC Services, Inc.,287 the New Jersey Superior Court
appropriately pierced the corporate veil.288 IBC had no assets except its
lease with a parent corporation.289 IBC was created for the sole purpose of
insulating the parent corporation from liability.290 Thus, the deliberately
undercapitalized company demonstrated fraud as well as an abuse of the
corporate form.291

281. U.S. DoD Policy “allows commanders and operators to exercise appropriate
levels of human judgment over the use of force.” See Perrigo, supra note 13. Russia also
does not support regulation of these systems arguing that IHL is sufficient. See id. China
has been silent. See id. However, The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots includes 22
countries who seek a pre-emptive ban on their use: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
See Country Views on Killer Robots, STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2NEqhmf.
282. See Perrigo, supra note 13; see also Delcker, supra note 3.
283. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297; see also supra Section II.C.
284. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297–99; see also supra Section II.C.
285. See supra Section II.C.
286. See supra Section II.C.
287. See OTR Assocs. v. IBC Servs., Inc., 801 A.2d 407, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002).
288. See id.
289. See id at 411.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 409-10.
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Unlike the corporation in OTR Associates, an autonomous weapon
system is not deliberately created to limit liability for the military.292
Although similar to shell corporations, in that autonomous systems lack
their own assets,293 the reason for their lack of assets differs. Shell
corporations often exist as limited liability loopholes.294 On the contrary,
weapons systems are pieces of technology that literally cannot hold or
receive financial assets. Instead of attempting to dodge liability,
autonomous systems expand military capabilities and minimize military
risk by accessing previously inaccessible locations and removing humans
from exceedingly dangerous missions.295 Further, unlike a corporation that
conducts business in its own name, a weapons system is a preprogrammed
tool on the battlefield that only follows the commands of its operator.296
Weapons systems do not fight as independent actors engaged in armed
conflict.297
The inapplicability of piercing the corporate veil to weapons systems
further distinguishes them from corporations and highlights how the
corporate personhood analogy fails in this context.298 Not only do different
laws govern autonomous systems than those that regulate corporations,299
but fundamental concepts of corporate law do not translate to regulating
weapons. The fact that weapons systems do not have assets is not an
indication of undercapitalization or fraud, but rather an inherent
characteristic of military technology, or of any inanimate object.
Ultimately, the inapplicability of a key method of corporate law further
supports the argument against extending legal personhood to an entity
distinct from a corporation.
D.

Recommendation

Legal personhood should not extend to autonomous systems. To
successfully extend this doctrine, corporate personhood would have to
successfully function under IHL.300 However, legal personhood does not
translate to an international context because the considerations used to
create a separate entity view of corporate personhood cannot apply to

292. Compare Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 72 with OTR Assocs., 801 A.2d
at 412.
293. A shell corporation is a corporation without active business and only exists to
serve another company’s business operations. Shell Corporation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
294. See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 123, at 297–99; see also supra Section II.C.
295. See UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP, supra note 110, at 20; see also
Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 68, at 72.
296. See Perrigo, supra note 13.
297. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 165, at 278.
298. See supra Section II.C.
299. See supra Section III.B.
300. See supra Section II.D.
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weapon systems,301 and customary international law indicates that the
concept of personhood should be restricted to actual persons.302 Further,
piercing the corporate veil, a key doctrine within corporate law, could not
apply under IHL given that some factors used to impose directors’
liability, such as undercapitalization, cannot apply to inanimate objects.303
Although autonomous systems continue to make more independent
decisions, governments and lawmakers should still view them only as
advanced pieces of technology.304 Despite their growing autonomy, at the
end of the day, these systems are machines.305 Because machines are not
the functional equivalent of human persons in war,306 their legal entity
status should not be conflated with that assigned to actual persons.307
Thus, as legislatures react to AI’s increasingly human characteristics,
they should recognize that acting like a human does not merit the legal
status of a human. Although corporations can perform functions similar to
those of humans, such as entering into contracts,308 corporations received
a legal status specific to their role in business,309 which evolved to reflect
the appropriate status of how corporations operate.310 Therefore, given that
autonomous systems are just advanced machines on the battlefield, they
do not merit a distinct legal entity status.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even though autonomous systems make increasingly independent
decisions, the argument of granting them legal personhood is without
merit. Although autonomous weapons systems engage in similar decisionmaking to that of humans,311 that similarity on its own is not enough to
justify granting them legal personhood.312 Because autonomous weapons
systems are weapons used in conflict, their use must comply with IHL.313
Furthermore, as evidenced by Kiobel and Mohamad, IHL views legal
personhood restrictively and would not support an extension to
autonomous weapons systems.314 Finally, the corporate law doctrine of

301. See supra Section III.A.
302. See supra Section III.B.
303. See supra Section III.C.
304. See supra Part I.
305. The law does not recognize technological innovations as legal persons. See
Bayern, supra note 1, at 93; see also supra Part I.
306. See supra Section III.B.
307. See supra Section III.B.
308. See Ripken, supra note 124, at 106; see also supra Section II.C.
309. See supra Section II.C.
310. See supra Section II.C.
311. See supra Section II.A.
312. See supra Section III.A–B.
313. See supra Section III.A.
314. See supra Section III.B.
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piercing the corporate veil does not apply to autonomous systems.315
Ultimately, the failed application of the corporate personhood analogy
under IHL combined with the inapplicability of a key principle of
corporate law indicates that extending legal personhood to autonomous
weapons systems cannot succeed.316 Autonomous weapons systems are
machines, and they should not receive a distinct type of legal
personhood.317

315. See supra Section III.C.
316. See supra Part III.
317. See supra Section III.D.

